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Two distinct views of the nature of clinical judgment are identified and contrasted. The
dominant view that clinical judgment is a fully explicit process is compared to the relatively
neglected view that tacit knowledge plays a substantial role in the clinician's mental operations.
The tacit dimension of medical thinking is explored at length. The discussion suggests severe
limits when applying decision analysis, expert systems, and computer-aided cost-benefit review to
medicine. The goals and practices ofpostgraduate medical education are alsoexamined from this
perspective, as are various other implications for the clinician. The paper concludes that it is
valuable to explore the nature of medical thinking in order to improve clinical practice and
education. Such explorations should, however, take cognizance of the often overlooked tacit
dimension of clinical judgment. Possible constraints on the medical applicability of both formal
expert systems and heavilydidactic instructional programs are considered.
Today's clinician confronts a rapidly changing health care industry. In the future he
will be making clinical judgments within a more structured context, in greater
accordance with guidelines and policies determined by professional health care man-
agers. With medical expenses now accounting for more than 11 percent of the gross
national product, up from 6 percent in 1965 [1], medical policy makers will increas-
ingly rely upon computer-aided decision theory and cost-management systems when
determining theconditions and efficacy ofclinical practice. Such policies will necessar-
ily alter the context in which clinical judgments are made. It is thus important to ask
whether the practice ofclinicaljudgment will be aided or hindered by the development
of more structured guidelines and computer-aided supervision and review of the
practitioner.
It therefore becomes important to consider the nature ofclinicaljudgment, to know
the conditions under which its practice will prosper or suffer. This paper is a step in that
direction, although its subject is limited toonly oneaspect ofthecognitive natureofthe
clinician's knowledge. It attempts to demonstrate that health care policy is being
shaped in accordance with a specific viewofthe natureofthis knowledge, a view which
could be said to perceive no difference in principle between the clinician's thought
processes and those of a sophisticated computer software program. At minimum, this
view holds that intuitive clinicaljudgment can beequalled oroutperformed by decision
analysis in many complex circumstances. This view ofclinicaljudgment contrasts with
an alternative view, one which takes account of a separate tacit dimension of clinical
judgment. This tacit dimension contains knowledge which could never be reduced to a
software program; consequently, it defines certain limits for the efficacy ofcomputer-
ized medical decision making and review. The distinction between these two views of
clinical judgment must be analyzed if we are to develop a useful knowledge of the
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conditions required for successful clinical judgment and practice. The implications of
this analysis for health care policy making, medical education, and clinical practice
will become apparent as the discussion proceeds.
Before turning to an analysis of these two views, let us briefly define the scope of
clinical judgment as it is discussed herein. For the current purpose, clinical judgment
refers to the totality ofthe mental processes involved in all stages at which the clinician
collects and interprets data; formulates a problem statement, confirms and refutes
diagnostic hypotheses; considers, plans, and implements possible diagnostic and thera-
peutic options, tests, and interventions; and evaluates likelihoods and outcomes. It is
often convenient to divide clinical judgment into several components; e.g., hypothesis
generation and evaluation; diagnostic and therapeutic outcome probability assessment;
and therapeutic strategy decision making. For the context of this discussion, no
distinction is drawn between thevarious stages and aspects ofthe clinician's enterprise.
Having outlined the territory to be explored under the concept ofclinical judgment,
let us begin by clearly distinguishing the two contrasting views of knowledge used in
such judgment and decision making. The dominant view among physicians and
educators, which is basically the only view acknowledged byprofessional policy makers
and cost analysts, is one that characterizes clinicaljudgment as a fully explicit process,
involving in all respects the conscious application of defined rules and knowledge. It
contrasts with the neglected view that tacit, or implicit, knowledge plays a substantial
role in clinical judgment. The neglected view, while not formally acknowledged by
many practicing clinicians, is, in fact, partly the basis for their increasing unease over
the growing role played in clinical medicine by the equations and computerized
programs of the policy makers and health care managers. In the discussion that
follows, the meaning and consequences for practice ofeach view will be discussed. The
primary intention is to elucidate the neglected tacit dimension ofclinicaljudgment and
emphasize certain significant aspects ofthis dimension for clinical practice, health care
policy, and medical education.
The first view, that medicine has a defined knowledge base which can be known,
communicated, and clinically applied in an entirely explicit, or overt, fashion is the
view that seems intuitively obvious to many observers. It is also the dominant theory
among scholars who analyze such professional activity as medicine [2,3] and is
uniformly accepted by health care software systems analysts and policy makers. In
essence, it holds that ideal clinical judgment consists exclusively of consciously
applying explicit knowledge to the patient's problem.
On this view, the body of medical knowledge is a mixture of explicitly known
observations, principles, and rules. This beliefdoes not mean that medicine is a purely
scientific endeavor. On the contrary, within this body of overt knowledge one can
discern two general categories, scientificand practical knowledge. The former category
comprises that medical knowledge which has been validated by scientific research. An
example is the knowledge obtained by applying the results of a prospective study
contrasting a given intervention with an alternative and concluding that one course is
associated with a favorable outcome. Scientific knowledge continues to increase in
medicine as clinical and basic research progresses.
The second category of explicit medical knowledge is practical knowledge-that is,
knowledge which has been established by prior clinical expertise [4] and empirically
thought to be useful, but which has not yet been subjected torigorous scientificanalysis
for confirmation or refutation. At present, medicine remains heavily reliant upon such
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practical knowledge because, as a young science undergoing transformation, its
knowledge base is still not fully systematized and standardized [5]. As medicine
matures, however, its scientific component will expand while the practical shrinks. As
the scientific realm enlarges by means of basic and clinical investigations, it will
encroach upon the diminishing domain of practical knowledge by allowing the physi-
cian to confirm or refute such knowledge experimentally. Ultimately the mixture of
practical and scientific knowledge upon which the clinician currently depends may be
replaced by a systematic body ofscientifically validated facts and rules.
Thus, the explicit view does not hold that medicine is a pure science. It fully
acknowledges that medical knowledge comprises two components, the scientific and
the practical. On this view, however, the components differ solely by the extent to
which the knowledge has been subjected to scientific validation. Both types of knowl-
edge are similar in that they are explicitly known by the clinician. They can both be
consciously applied in practice, conveyed and acquired during instruction, and both are
well itemized and described in the medical literature [6,7]. True, practical knowledge
lacks the important advantage ofscientific validation, but its ultimate confirmation or
refutation is basically a matter of time. The essential point of this view is that all
medical knowledge, whether scientific or practical, comprises a body of fully explicit
knowledge.
The important consequence of this view is that if the clinician possesses such an
exclusively explicit body ofmedical knowledge, then clinicaljudgment can be seen as a
task of problem solving whereby the clinician consciously identifies his diagnostic and
therapeutic options by applying explicitly known clinical facts and rules to the specific
case at hand. Of course, such application is not always a simple process, especially
when the complexity and uncertainty involved in the specific case are great. One ofthe
important consequences of this view, however, is that, in particularly complex cases,
the clinician can make productive use of such formal quantitative models as decision
analysis. The premise underlying the use offormal models is that, given adequate data
and computing capability, it is possible to build a prescriptive system capable of
complex clinical decision making [8,9]. This task is achieved by separating the
components ofthe decision problem, analyzing and quantifying them individually, and
then recombining them systematically to make the optimal decision. Since no clinician
can intuitively consider all the important factors in a complex clinical decision [10], a
formal system which can explicitly identify and quantify all relevant data, options, and
outcomes is thought to have a greater potential ability than intuition for dealing with
complexity and uncertainty.
In summary, on this view, explicit thought processes fully constitute and explain
clinical judgment. A corollary point is that formal models can introduce additional
systematization into these overt processes and thereby mimic, improve, and extend
clinical judgment. Optimal clinical decision making then depends upon exactly identi-
fying, quantifying, and integrating all relevant data, options, and outcomes [11].
Obviously then, to the extent that these relevant variables can be overtly identified and
quantified, the clinician will be successful. On the other hand, to the extent that the
clinician fails to make explicit key information, he cannot adequately use such
knowledge and may overlook the optimal decision. The presumed advantage offormal
models is precisely their ability to enhance the clinician's likelihood of success by
providing him increased precision and organization [12]. As we shall see, these formal
models hold special attraction for health care policy makers.
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Without question, the explicit theory is a widely held view of the nature of
professional judgment, especially clinical judgment. At first glance, it appears intu-
itively obvious. It is clearly the view described in most scholarly discussions of the
subject [2,3] and the basis for much teaching in the clinical setting [13,14]. It also
provides much of the theoretical base upon which is built the impressive edifice of
decision analysis, artificial intelligence expert systems, and applications for clinical
prediction rules, algorithms, andjudgment theory. The explicit view holds that precise
policies can be devised with the capability of designating universal rules to govern
individual medical cases. Thus, this view provides the foundation for the decision
theory approach to medicine of the cost-management systems which are currently
proliferating in number and influence among policy analysts. It is also influencing
medical and postgraduate education and training. We shall return to these points.
Before we do so, it becomes essential to ask whether the explicit view actually provides
a complete and satisfactory explanation ofthe clinicaljudgment process.
Let us now look at thedissenting opinion, the theoryoftacit knowledge [15,16], orof
professional judgment as knowing-in-action [6]. On this second view, it is an error to
expect or assist the clinician to make fully explicit and quantifiable the entire range of
data and rules he uses in clinical judgment. Much of the knowledge he uses is not
explicit, could not be made explicit, and does not need to be.
To understand this second view, we must initially ask: What is knowledge that is not
explicit? At first glance, this question seems a contradiction: to know something would
seen to include the ability explicitly to identify and communicate its essence. Not
necessarily. On this alternative view, there is also tacit knowledge, i.e., knowledge
which is possessed and utilized on an implicit, or subsidiary, level without conscious
awareness. In extensive discussions, Michael Polanyi [17] argues that clinicians
possess both explicit knowledge, of which the content and use are subject to focal
conscious awareness, and tacit knowledge, which is not explicitly experienced. In fact,
he argues, there is a tacit component to all knowledge, including explicit knowledge.
Although we make many decisions at an explicit level, a wholly explicit system of
knowledge is impossible. Tacit integrations underlie our conscious deliberations; their
speed and complexity permit our explicit operations to function. We have all experi-
enced an intuitive insight allowing us to arrive at an unaccountable conclusion in a
flash. Polanyi would attribute the rapidity of this process to tacit integrations which
underlie and facilitate conscious reasoning.
We shall elucidate the theoryoftacit knowledge in much greater detail. At this point
it may be appropriate to pause for a critical observation. In modern professional
education, there is a dominant epistemological tradition, i.e., dominant theory of how
professionals think and know. This tradition strongly emphasizes an exclusive role for
explicit knowledge in such enterprises, and relegates tacit knowledge to the realm of
non-professional, irrational, or even mystical thought. Thus, clinicians and medical
policy makers educated within this widely accepted tradition are likely to find the
components of the theory of tacit knowledge unfamiliar. Measured against the
standards of explicit thought, these concepts initially appear vague, nonspecific, or
confused. In anticipation of this possibility, I offer in defense the promise that the
concepts will become clearer as the discussion proceeds. Initially, according to the
reader's personal introspection, he or she may vary in affinity for the theory. The value
ofseriously considering this unfamiliar alternative view ofclinicaljudgment lies in the
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implications of the theory for clinical practice, medical education, and health care
policy making, as we shall see.
It is important to recognize that this view is not simply an argument that expert
clinicians make decisions and take actions more rapidly than do students and residents
because they can shorten the time needed consciously to analyze and makedecisions in
complex situations. Nor is it simply an argument that medical knowledge comprises
the two previously discussed categories of consciously used knowledge, scientific and
practical. Both such arguments are undoubtedly true; however, the theory of tacit
knowledge argues something quite different; i.e., that, in addition to explicit knowl-
edge, clinicians also possess and utilize implicit, or tacit, awareness of a vast and
indeterminate range of data, amounting to actual knowledge that cannot be explicitly
stated. Let us explore further the complex natureoftacit knowledge.
Tacit knowledge cannot be articulated in explicit terms. It is the "knowing how"
which the clinician partners with the "knowing what" ofhis explicit information. That
is, it is the implicit knowledge which tells him how to use his explicitly known facts and
rules. As such, tacit knowledge is involved in the acquisition and use ofphysical skills,
mental abilities, and those processes which combine both. First we shall consider
several examples of basic skills that illustrate the role of the tacit dimension. Then we
will carry the discussion over to the domain ofcomplex mental abilities such as clinical
judgment.
A simple example of tacit knowledge is the knowledge of how to ride a bicycle.
Bicycle riding is a skill requiring complex knowledge ofmultiple interrelated muscular
movements. That knowledge, once possessed, is used almost effortlessly; however, it is
beyond the conscious awareness of the user. That is, it is not possible for the rider to
specify or to be focally aware of all the muscle group interactions involved in the
process, even as he rides the bicycle. To the extent that such unspecifiable knowledge is
used, the skill ofbicycle riding is as much an art ofdoing as it is an art ofknowing [18].
In other words, this inarticulable knowledge is contained and expressed in actions
rather than conscious thoughts.
Consider next the example of the knowledge used to recognize one special human
face in a crowd. It is difficult, ifnot impossible, to itemize and describefully all the cues
and variables which are identified and integrated during the common process of not
only distinguishing one human face from all others, but also recognizing the mood or
attitude communicated via that human face. Nevertheless, although such knowledge
cannot be expressed in explicit terms, it can be well known and used on a tacit level.
Indeed, the experienced pediatrician relies on similar knowledge to distinguish the face
ofthe toxic infant from that ofthe merely irritated or tired child.
Another example of the tacit dimension is the surgeon's knowledge of the precise
amount of tension to exert upon the suture. This perception is not information he
possesses and communicates in explicit terms. Rather, it is knowledge he feels and
shows during the practice of the skill. In fact, consider the example of the surgeon's
ability to operate by using various instruments as though they are extensions ofhis own
hand. The tacit knowledgeofhow to use and feel through a tool, and ofhow to know the
spatial position of the tip of the instrument as if it were one's own fingertip, is well
known to many artisans and craftsmen, as well as surgeons, but cannot be articulated
in explicit terms.
Perhaps an even better example to clarify the difference between tacit and explicit
knowledge can be borrowed from the field of music. Consider the expert pianist who
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can perform brillantly, but freezes in mid-concert if he begins to concentrate on the
movement of his fingers instead ofthe music. This experience can occur because piano
playing is a complex skill, involving many essential tacit and explicit components which
are integrated by tacitly held knowledge. During practice, the pianist acquired some of
this tacit knowledge in an explicit fashion; however, after he integrated it into his tacit
awareness he began to possess and use it without conscious reflection. Indeed, his
attempt during the performance to focus consciously on this tacitly held knowledge is
not only unsuccessful, it can disrupt his skillful performance. This example demon-
strates the important claim that tacit knowledge, once acquired, can be used and
acknowledged, but it cannot necessarily be identified or analyzed.
Bicycle riding, recognizing a face and its mood, using surgical instruments, and
piano playing are all examples of skills and abilities that appear to rely strongly upon
tacit knowledge. That is, one cannot consciously identify all the routines and knowl-
edge employed when using these skills. In fact, as we shall discuss further, there is
actual knowledge contained in the possession and use of such skills, knowledge which
cannot be specified or articulated on an explicit level.
The theory as expressed thus far may impress the reader as more applicable to
physical skills and abilities, such as surgical techniques and methods of physical
examination. Perhaps the reader can introspectively identify many other familiar
physical skills which are practiced by using tacit routines without focal awareness.
Oakeshott [19], however, argues that the use of tacit knowledge is not limited to the
practice of skills and abilities which involve physical doing or making; rather, it is
equally important to skills composed of mental operations, such as clinical judgment.
On this view, the knowledge employed in any skill, physical or mental, can be divided
into two partnered components: explicit and tacit. The use of the explicit component of
knowledge, the "knowing what," actually depends upon the underlying tacit compo-
nent, the "knowing how." Let us look at these two components in the context ofclinical
judgment.
First, consider the explicit component. In the context of clinical judgment, the
explicit component is all the information the clinician can acquire, i.e., the explicit
knowledge whereby what he knows may be defined, itemized, and conveyed by
instruction. It includes facts, rules, and propositions, mostly accepted on authority, and
is found in the articles, manuals, and textbooks ofthe medical literature. It includes our
knowledge of the diagnostic signs and symptoms, the therapeutic options, the possible
outcomes, the various probabilities involved, and so on. This is the knowledge used to
construct decision trees and clinical rules. This is the explicit medical information
which is used to provide the appropriate answer to questions which ask: what? where?
when? which? how long? how much? how likely? and the like [19]. Such explicit
information is an ingredient ofall medical knowledge. It ranges from vague identifica-
tions to formal propositions and rules. It is the totality of the information used by the
software systems experts. But this explicit information never constitutes the whole of
what the clinician knows. The complementary component of the partnership of
knowledge is the tacit dimension.
The tacit dimension ofclinical expertise is the implicit knowledge which constitutes
the "knowing how," which the clinician partners with the "knowing what" of his
explicit information. It is this component, unspecifiable in propositions, which cannot
be resolved into explicit information, but which enables the clinician to use such
information.
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This is the knowledge required to interpret and decide the relevance of explicit
information, and used to recognize and apply the appropriate explicit rules to a given
problem. For example, it is the knowledge which goes beyond the physical findings, lab
data, and clinical rules when the intensivist fine tunes the controls of a mechanical
ventilator. It is all that knowledge which integrates and permits the choice and use of
the appropriate explicit rules and methods. It is the knowledge excluded from decision
trees and software systems. Indeed, without tacit judgment, isolated explicit informa-
tion may or may not be useful. Isolated, the greatest value ofexplicit information to the
clinician may be when he takes an examination or presents a case discussion. In his
daily practice, such information is not isolated, but is united with tacit knowledge,
enabling the clinician to recognize the applicable clinical rules and integrate the
appropriate data.
Consider as an example the expert radiologist [20], who can sort through a range of
vague shadows and shapes and find concealed therein a panorama ofsignificant details.
Although explicit data and rules greatly inform his task, it is tacit judgment which
unites with that information to generate his diagnostic skill. Indeed, the complex task
of the radiology resident, requiring four years of apprenticeship, is not simply to retire
to the library and memorize volumes of images and the rules for their interpretation.
That might be relatively easy; however, the task is to also master the tacit routines
which complement the explicit rules of the practice, which tell him which rules to
employ when, and which case requires the use ofwhich information.
In order to clarify further the distinction between the two dimensions of knowledge,
tacit and explicit, let us contrast them in terms of how they are taught to students. On
the one hand, the teacher deliberately communicates explicit information to the
student by instruction, which consists of conveying specific, impersonal, hard, isolated
facts and rules. Lectures and reading assignments are liberally employed to convey this
material. Such informing, or instructing, is a form of communication which contrasts
with a much subtler process, whereby the teacher imparts, or implants, the tacit
knowledge of how to identify and use the relevant explicit information. This tacit
component must be united with the explicit component to generate knowledge or
ability. It cannot be taught separately or overtly, but it may be implanted in everything
that is taught. It is best shared via case presentations, rounds, and demonstrations.
Thus, on this view, learning is a twofold activity composed of both acquiring explicit
information and coming to possess the tacit ability to use that information [19].
A familiar phenomenon is the expert clinician who can teach best by demonstrating
his problem-solving skill, but is less adept when attempting to offer a convincing
reconstruction of the mental steps in the process. Such reconstructions are often naive
and unsatisfying when offered to explain cases of complex clinical judgment, seeming
to fail to account for key elements of the mental process [21]. One is tempted to
attribute the clinician's reliance on demonstration over explanation to a personal
failure ofintrospection, that is, to a personal inability to describe the conscious clinical
rules comprising his practice. One may suggest the clinical or teaching skills of such a
physician are in some way inadequate; i.e., that he simply cannot remember, recon-
struct, and communicate the explicit pattern of his thinking. After all, the argument
goes, it seems reasonable to expect that the clinician's conscious knowledge, whether
scientific evidence or practical clinical expertise, should be explicitly known and
communicable by that clinician. Nevertheless, the common occurrence ofthis phenom-
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enon in even the acknowledged best and brightest practitioners casts doubt on that
tempting explanation [21,22].
The theory of tacit knowledge provides a different explanation. It argues that the
clinician-teacher has not failed introspectively to reconstruct and describe the explicit
knowledge and rules he uses. On thecontrary, he teaches the explicit information well.
Theproblem isthat he isdescribingonly theexplicit knowledge and rules, and omitting
the complementary component of his knowledge, the tacit component. The tacit
component cannot be described because the clinician is not, by definition, aware ofhow
he uses it. When he practices his skill, however, his success involves the union of his
tacitly held routines and practices with hisexplicitly known facts and rules.
Thus, in such an instance, the clinician's explanation of his mental process is
unsatisfyingprecisely because it omits thiskey tacitcomponent. The more complex the
problem and the moreexperienced theclinician, thegreater may be his reliance upon a
union of tacit and explicit knowledge. This factor increases the possibility that his
explication oftheprocess will be less satisfying and accurate, relying, as it necessarily
must, solely upon the explicit rules and information used. When the matter is
understood in thislight, it is realized that some instances ofinadequate explanation are
due to theexpert clinician's failure to describe fully these tacitly held routines. In such
cases, this failure does not diminish his ability and should not be construed as a
deficiencyofknowledge,practice, orteaching. Rather, it must be understood that when
he provides his students formal instruction in the explicit rules and information to be
used, heconveys only onecomponent ofthe knowledge used. The complementary task
in teaching clinicaljudgment involves imparting the tacit judgments that need to be
united with that explicit information in order to generate knowledge or skill [19]. On
this view, the importance and difficulty ofimparting tacit knowledge has significance
for medical education and postgraduate training programs, as we shall later consider.
In summary, the theory of tacit knowledge argues that skillful clinical judgment
relies on more than explicit knowledge of clinical rules; the skill also makes use of
tacitly held knowledge. It thus leads to the conclusion that our knowledge of medicine
contains a vastrangeofunspecifiableelements; e.g., relationships and correlations that
are not precisely definable, which we integrate by tacit mechanisms. If so, then
medicine will consequently always remain, in principle, a descriptive science relying
heavilyupon trainedperception, immeasurably rich in things that we know but cannot
tell [23]. If so, in principle, no amount of scientific validation of practical clinical
expertise, no degree of systematization of clinical rules into formal systems, no
enhancement of our ability to achieve precise measurement and quantification of
probabilities, however important all these achievements will surely be, can eliminate
thepermanent andimportant role oftacit knowledge in clinical judgment.
Thistheorythat successful clinicaljudgments aremade, in part, by observing a set of
tacit maxims or routines which are not fully known to the clinician means that,
although theexplicit rules ofclinical practice are useful, they do not wholly determine
thepractice.They can serve as aguideonly ifthey can beintegrated into the clinician's
tacitknowledge.Theycannotreplace this knowledge. Forexample, the expert pediatri-
cian who, taking telephone consultations, consistently recognizes the rare pediatric
emergency among the continuous stream of benign problems relies on more than the
explicit rules of pediatric practice. Of course, the greater explicit knowledge and
abilities of the expert pediatrician are important in this context. But, if we deny the
separate and distinct roleoftacitknowledge in such tasks, we may refuse to accept the
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feasibility of something alleged to have been done or observed because we cannot
understand it in terms of our conscious framework. By doing so, we may explain away
genuine routines or experiences which are essential to clinical practice.
Thetheory oftacitknowledge is repugnant to those clinicians who see only a role for
explicit knowledge in their practice. They are uneasy with the thought that clinical
judgments may rely in principle on tacitly held knowledge which is not and cannot be
made explicit by the clinician [10,12]. They reject the view that an important
dimension of clinical judgment must remain unaffected by increasingly sophisticated
manipulation and quantification of explicit data and rules. On the other hand,
proponents of the tacit theory are equally dismayed by the contention of the opposing
view, that before the clinician can make an optimal judgment he must try as much as
possible to account for and quantify every aspect of the problem, including all the
available information sources, options, outcomes, and potential events [24]. They
claim that therequirement forquantification andsystematic exploration ofall relevant
data is too cumbersome to be applicable to the complexities of the clinical situation
[25]. On this view, full quantification may even be an unachievable goal, because it
demands a greater role for explicit knowledge than is required or possible in clinical
judgment [26,27,28]. Shortly, we shall see how these opposing contentions come into
open conflict over theefficacy ofthe formalsystems used by cost-management analysts.
At firstglance, this debateappears to be one more recasting ofthe age-old, recurring
controversy over whether clinical practice is predominantly art or science [5,22,29];
however, that may not be the most salient characterization of the issues involved.
Actually, the artversus sciencecontroversy mostcommonly focuses on the relationship
between practical knowledge (art) and scientific knowledge in clinical judgment. The
debate isusually over theproportions, relativesignificance, and interdependence ofthe
twocomponents. Assuch, itsmajor focus is on the extent and desirability ofsystemati-
zation of medical knowledge. It is often accepted by both sides, however, that clinical
judgment is a wholly explicit process, blending explicit practical knowledge with
explicit scientific knowledge.
The present discussion focuses on a distinctly separate pair of alternatives. Specifi-
cally, this choice is over whether clinicaljudgment involves a wholly explicit system of
rules and methods which can be identified, systematized, taught, and reviewed; or, on
the other hand, whether it is also dependent upon tacit knowledge which cannot be
overtly defined, even by the clinician as he uses it. The significance of whether there is
an important tacit dimension in clinical judgment is the possible relevance of that
dimension to actual practice, to medical education, and to health care policy making.
Thus, let us now consider some specific implications ofthis view.
From the perspective of clinical practice, one of the foremost conclusions of the
theory of tacit knowledge is that some essential knowledge inheres in the clinician's
skill; thus, hispractice ofthis skill is as much an art ofdoing as an art ofknowing [30].
In other words, like riding a bicycle or playing a piano, clinical practice involves a
tacitly held set ofroutines, theknowing ofwhich are implicit in the clinician's actions.
In fact, much oftheknowledge he uses isactuallycontained and expressed through his
actions, not his conscious thoughts. He does not always reflect on his use of such
knowledge untilduring or aftertheaction, and not always even then. In concrete terms,
this means theclinicianmayachievediagnosticclosure and decide upon a management
course without knowing every routine used in that mental process.
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Subsequently, when searching for a rationale for his diagnosis or decision, he may
introspectively reconsider the process in more explicit detail. As discussed above,
although a rationale can usually be found, it will not necessarily reflect the tacit
knowledge inherent in the decision-making process. The clinician may not be aware of
that knowledge. In fact, he may be fully unaware of ever coming to possess certain
knowledge in his skills; he may simply find himself using the knowledge by practicing
the skill. This concept has been termed knowing-in-action [6,7].
An important application of this view concerns the utility of decision analysis or
related artificial intelligence expert systems. Such approaches develop comprehensive
systems of explicit rules which quantify and integrate data, options, and outcomes to
prescribe optimal decisions. In principle, such systems are self-sufficient; that is, they
can replace clinical intuition in a variety of clinical settings [31,32]. They are
considered potentially useful for dealing with complex clinical choices [9,10] because
they force the clinician toconsider explicitly all theoptions and consequences in a given
case. These systems are currently receiving much attention from those charged with
developing guidelines and policies for administering health care. Cost-management
companies are rapidly expanding from their previously limited role ofjudging the need
for second opinions pre-operatively and overnight hospital stays post-operatively. They
now provide extensive consultation to third-party payors on many aspects of medical
expenditures and clinical practice. They do so by employing increasingly sophisticated
software systems which use formal decision models to scrutinize and influence more
and more details of clinical judgment [1]. Adherence to the standards of practice
dictated by such explicit models is becoming less an option and more an obligation of
the practicing clinician.
These formal prescriptive theories such as decision analysis require that all relevant
data and options be explicitly recognized and processed so that the problem can be
structured properly. This requirement means the user must identify and itemize all
potential data, actions, options, and outcomes in an overt and quantitative fashion
[11,32]. Clearly, these self-sufficient systems are more attractive to those who see a
larger or even an exclusive role for explicit knowledge and judgment in clinical
medicine. To them, the requirement that the decision problem be fully structured in an
overt fashion appears a logical extension of optimal intuitive reasoning, carrying the
process a step further toward ideal formalization [24,33]. On these terms, the
structuring of a decision tree has the advantage of stimulating a more complete
problem formulation and of forcing the clinician to recognize various hidden relation-
ships [12]. Since clinical judgment is a fully explicit process, any attempt to increase
precision and quantification can only be beneficial.
On the other hand, as discussed above, dissenters have raised concerns that the
fundamental obstacle to the success offormal models may be the extent to which such
thorough identification and processing of information is possible [11,25-28]. Indeed,
essential information is often unavailable, as is true of various test sensitivities and
specificities required to perform decision analysis [25]. The clinician may not have
access to the data necessary for these models. More important, as we have seen, there
may be tacit knowledge which is simply unknowable by the formal model. That is,
these models must ignore knowing-in-action, that tacit portion of the clinician's
knowledge which is only known through actual practice and action. If there is
significant tacit knowledge which the clinician uses but cannot and does not explicitly
identify, then it will not be contained within the structure of the formal system. If so,
the use offormal models may require not only more explicit knowledge than is actually
56THE TACIT DIMENSION OF CLINICAL JUDGMENT
used, accessible, or required by the clinician; it may require knowledge that is
unspecifiable in principle. Full structuring and application of such models may not be
merely cumbersome; it may be impossible.
Cognitive psychologists have identified various inconsistencies between decision
outcomes predicted by explicit decision theory and those achieved by intuitive clinical
decision making. Studies have clearly shown that the clinician does not always reach
the conclusions one would predict by assuming his adherence to rational decision
theory. These findings have been used to suggest that unaided intuition is inferior to
formal systems at complex decision making. The other possibility, however, is that
formal decision theory fails because it lacks certain essential knowledge possessed by
the clinician in actual practice.
For example, as an explanation of the clinician's failure to adhere consistently to
principles of rational decision theory, Beach and Mitchell [34] developed the contin-
gency model which notes that such decision behavior can be seen as perfectly rational
providing the costs of being rational are taken into account. The point of their
argument is that clinical judgment strategies differ with respect to both the cognitive
effort they require, and the probability that they will lead to an optimal solution.
Consequently, physician strategy selection must be understood as contingent upon a
cost-benefit compromise he makes between the level of accuracy desired and the
appropriate investment of time, money, and effort. The outcome of this compromise
may violate decision theory, but it is often a rational decision based on tacit knowledge
lacking in the formal system against which his judgment is measured. Thus, the
decision theory, not the clinician, may be in error when discrepancies arise.
Similarly, Thorngate [35] noted that on occasion clinicians appear to violate
probabilistic reasoning principles predicted by formal theories. He suggests the reason
is that, in certain contexts, clinicians may not notice or care about small or infrequent
decrements in reward, which may result from their ignorance or misuse ofprobabilistic
reasoning. Often, they may not use such information because the time or effort
required to use it properly may be more costly than any decrease in payoffs associated
with their occasional suboptimal choices. Thus, the clinician may adapt his motives to
accommodate his cognitive limits and his task. Such a decision may be based on tacit
knowledge unavailable to the software analyst.
As a final example, Hogarth [36] and Politser [37] have separately developed
support for what can be termed thecontinuity argument [38]. The essence of this view
is that clinical decisions must be viewed as moments in the context of a continuous and
changing process or environment. If they are seen instead as discrete or static
phenomena, then their relevance as highly functional adaptations to the changing
continuum of clinical decisions involving serial information will be missed. Explicit
formal systems lack the specific, often tacit, knowledge of the dynamic context and
suffer diminished utility as a consequence.
This is not the place to review all the objections to formal decision theory as it has
been applied to clinical practice. These three examples are used to illustrate the fact
that the clinician acts on the basis of much dynamic and complex knowledge, some of
which istacitlyrecognized andintegrated when he makes clinicaljudgments. Decision
theory as currently formulated is inadequate to the task of incorporating and using all
such knowledge, especially the tacit component. When the clinician errs according to
the standards ofa formalsystem, itmay be as reasonable to challenge the system as the
clinician.
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Ofcourse, it is not the aim ofthese formal systems to mimic actual humanjudgment,
only to equal or surpass its decision-making performance [39-41]. Therefore, it is not
necessary for such prescriptive expert systems to reproduce the tacit processes occur-
ring in the human mind, just to reach the best judgment. The important question is
whether that goal can be achieved by a fully explicit system which ignores whatever
unspecifiable tacit knowledge is included in the skill of clinical judgment. To decision
theorists and cost-management analysts, it is conceivable that exclusively explicit
reasoning can, aided by adequate computing power, identify and manipulate sufficient
facts and rules to achieve optimal judgments in complex cases. Those preferring to
focus on the role of tacit mental powers are more pessimistic over clinical judgment
performed by a formal system, without the clinician's tacit knowledge, routines,
integrations, and skills.
Decision trees, algorithms, clinical prediction rules, and formal models are clearly
useful in uncomplicated clinical situations [42-45]. The value of these aids in the
appropriate context is uncontestable. But even the most sophisticated formal systems
may not, in principle, have access to sufficient knowledge for them to equal the
capability of clinical intuition in more complex cases. Rather than aid the clinician in
such cases, these formal models may actually hinder his intuition by their cumbersome
requirements for explicit identification and quantification ofall variables.
The context of health care delivery is changing, and decision and cost-management
theories are being increasingly applied to the administration and supervision ofclinical
practice. Decision theory is attractive to policy makers since it appears to offer the
opportunity systematically to review and influence clinical practice, pushing it in a
direction that seems to favor quality and cost-effectiveness of care. It appears to allow
the invention of explicit universal rules that apply to all individual cases. As we have
seen, however, the role oftacit knowledge in clinicaljudgment may define the limits of
utility and applicability for decision theory and explicit cost-management policies.
These theories and policies may lack essential tacit knowledge, making them prone to
failure in complex cases. At minimum, it appears that the recognition of the tacit
dimension may necessitate the development of a significantly more dynamic and
sophisticated theory of medical decision making before policy makers can use it to
influence clinical practice without hindering the exercise of clinical judgment. Until
these theories can incorporate such tacitly recognized factors as the constantly
changing continuum of clinical decisions, their utility will be limited. Given the
increasing encroachment of cost-management systems into the realm of clinical
judgment, these latter concerns deserve attention.
Let us now turn to another area where the role of the tacit dimension in clinical
judgment is also important: postgraduate medical education. As we have seen, if the
expert clinician relies in part upon observance ofa setoftacit maxims or routines which
are not fully known tohim, then theexplicit rulesofclinical practice are important, but
do not fully determine the nature of that practice. When the clinician teaches these
explicit rules, he is conveying only one component of his practice, a component which
can serve as a guide only when integrated into the complementary tacit component of
the operation. It is the union of the partnered tacit and explicit components which
generates clinical expertise. But the tacit component is omitted from formal instruc-
tion, which necessarily reconstructs and explains only the explicit mental process used.
Thus, the expert clinician can only explain to the resident so much of the course of
action required. To a significant extent, he must supplement his explicit instruction by
imparting his tacitjudgment as well, which is bestconveyed by demonstrating his skill.
58THE TACIT DIMENSION OF CLINICAL JUDGMENT
In this way he can also impart the knowledge which inheres within the practice of his
skill [20,22,46,47].
This is why so much of medicine is transmitted by example, in the traditional
relationship of master and apprentice. It cannot be fully transmitted by explanation or
prescription, because no complete prescription exists. This explains the peculiar
relationship of the resident or fellow to the expert clinician: To learn by example is to
submit to authority. By watching the master and emulating his efforts, the apprentice
unconsciously picks up and comes to possess the rules of the art, including those not
explicitly known to the master himself. We have seen that to the extentthat ourclinical
knowledge lacks precise formalization, we act by means of unspecifiable knowledge,
and the clinician's skill is as much an art ofdoing as it is an art of knowing. An art of
doing is best communicated by example, not by precept. To come to possess such
knowledge, a long course ofexperience under a master is required. In effect, the trainee
must come to know personally the basis ofclinicaljudgment through experience under
an expert clinician's guidance. Thus, the traditionally long length of the clinical
training period attests to the extent to which tacit knowledge has remained unspecifi-
able at the heart ofmedicine.
What does all this imply for postgraduate training programs? First, clinical training
requires an extended course during which there is substantial exposure to actual
clinical practice. It must involve close supervision of the trainee by the expert. Any
attempts to shorten the training period, to replace actual clinical exposure with other
activity, and to reduce the level of direct supervision of the resident by the attending,
may be particularly detrimental in those specialties where clinical judgment is
especially complex.
Second, although close supervision is necessary, clinical judgment skills cannot be
imparted without substantial opportunity for the residents and fellows to practice the
skills. These skills are learned by practice, by doing, and, without such repetition,
cannot become instilled. Thus, legislative proposals to diminish the amount of actual
practice and responsibility undertaken by residents in training, especially in the
surgical fields, are proposals that would hinder efforts to train new clinicians. Such
proposals are based on the assumption that the bulk ofmedical knowledge is conveyed
by transmitting explicit rules, rather than by imparting tacit knowledge through
repeated example and practice.
In summary, what then are the important consequences of the theory of tacit
knowledge for the clinician, educator, or policy maker? First, the tacit dimension of
clinicaljudgment may be significant when determining the structure, length, and goals
ofpostgraduate training programs. The theory leads to the conclusion that the nature
ofclinicaljudgment requires a lengthy residency, one in which the novice works closely
at the side of the mentor. Furthermore, the resident needs to acquire a critical base of
knowledge and experience before he can fully possess and use tacit knowledge. The
level at which the physician becomes comfortable with his skill, the point at which
clinical practice becomes pleasurable, is only reached after years of training and
experience. The theory also suggests that medical training and practice contain
knowledge and routines which have evolved over a long period of time, and which
should be changed only very cautiously. These routines may exist, in part, for the
purpose of imparting tacitly held knowledge which cannot be otherwise conveyed. In
fact, the evolved patterns ofpostgraduate medical education may be a valuable model
for other disciplines. Indeed, the emergence and growth of postdoctoral fellowship
programs may be a recognition ofthe fact that knowing-in-action is imparted in many
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fields, not just clinical medicine. Through such programs, scientific training is coming
more closely to resemble medical training.
Second, the theory suggests that the role for formal decision models in clinical
medicine is strictly limited. The inability of these systems to possess and use tacit
knowledge limits their capability relative to expert clinical intuition. Although per-
ceived as uniformly cost-effective, these models may often be less cost-effective than
encouraging clinicians to utilize their tacit abilities. Such tacit abilities may contain
much more knowledge and their use may be far more cost-effective than that of any
explicit computer program. Residents and clinicians who are more comfortable
running computer programs than using tacit knowledge may prove very expensive in
the long run.
Third, and perhaps most important, the theory of tacit knowledge has far-reaching
implications for one's personal philosophy of practice and teaching. There is a certain
conceit associated with the view that clinicians or policy makers can develop a fully
explicit understanding ofevery issue. This conviction that a decision tree, blueprint, or
computer analysis can be used to solve any problem may be a more frequent source of
failed schemes than is recognized. It may be preferable to possess a sound recognition
ofthe limitations as well as the capabilities imposed by the nature ofclinicaljudgment.
The concerns raised herein are particularly important since medical education and
postgraduate training are receiving increasing scrutiny and revision. Furthermore, at
this timeofgreatchange in the health care industry, it is clear that clinical practice and
health care delivery will be influenced by the view of clinical judgment of the
professional cost managers and policy makers. Although it is currently fashionable in
both professional policy-making and educational circles to focus less on the tacit
dimension of clinical judgment than on the explicit aspects of the process, it may be
prudent to recognize equally both components ofthis partnership ofknowledge [48].
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